

**Leninism :
Pathway to Dictatorship?**

By

Samuel Aubrey Summers

**Senior Seminar: Hst 499
Professor [Bau-Hwa Hsieh](#)
Western Oregon University
June 7, 2007**

**Readers
Professor David Doellinger
Professor Dean Braa**

Copyright © Michael Anderson, 2007

Vladimir Lenin's *What Is to Be Done?* and *State and Revolution* laid the foundation for a centralist dictatorship in Russia. In both of these documents, Lenin outlines plans to create a Marxist state in Russia. Lenin faced the difficulty of an agrarian society with a small working class ruled by a 300 year-old autocracy. Lenin wrote *What Is to Be Done?* in 1903 as an outline of how to educate an agrarian society and introduce socialism. By July 1917, when he wrote *State and Revolution*, Russia was in the middle of World War One and the autocracy had crumbled. In the fifteen years between the two documents, Lenin faced challenges to his leadership within the party, and an increasingly chaotic political scene in Russia. Leninism would shape the outcome of the October 1917 Revolution and Russia's view of the world in the 20th century. A comparison of the two documents reveals an evolution toward a centralized party entity designed to bring socialism to Russia.

What Is to Be Done? and *State and Revolution* helped bring about drastic changes in Russia at the beginning of the 20th century. During the late 19th and early 20th century, many groups within Russia were trying desperately to move the country from an agrarian society to an industrialized one. The autocracy made it difficult for the movements preceding Lenin's Bolshevism to bring about the necessary changes to industrialize Russia. While trying to maintain the authority of the autocracy Russia's Tsars were unable to change Russia to the satisfaction of reformists within Russian society. This inflexible political and social policy would lead to the failure of revolutionary movements throughout the 19th century that failed to change Russia's political and social structure. *What Is to Be Done?* and *State and Revolution* outlined organizational changes that Lenin believed the Russian socialist party needed to challenge the autocracy. Lenin introduced

his Vanguard Party theory as a way to bring socialism to Russia; this theory introduced organization and discipline to a movement that had possessed little of either until Lenin's changes. The changes that Lenin introduced would aid him in his successful revolution, but after his death those same changes would open the way for a dictator to control Russia and corrupt Lenin's vision of a utopian worker's society.

Prior to 1903 there were many failed political movements that tried and failed to reform Russia; liberalism, populism, and Marxist and non-Marxist socialism. These movements for political reform began after the Napoleonic wars of the early 19th century. Russia's armies returned from France carrying with them the ideas of the enlightenment. The enlightenment ideals sparked the call for political reform from all sectors of Russian society; the nobility, the intelligentsia, the workers, and the peasants. Reformation of the political and social systems threatened the Tsar's hold on Russia. All of the social movements pushed for reform; Bolshevism was the socialist movement that succeeded where Liberal and Populist movements failed.

Liberalism was the first political movement to attempt reform in Russia. In the 1820's Russian Liberal's tried to get the Tsar to introduce a constitution that would give basic civil rights to Russian citizens and create a representative legislative body to represent them. The Liberals objective was to reform Russia from the top down. With the refusal of the Tsar and the lack of popular support the Liberal movement failed with the defeat of the Decembrist Revolt of 1825, Liberalism lost its substantial support and became a marginalized movement in Russia. With the marginalization of the Liberalist movement a populist movement arose in Russia to try to change Russia to a representative government.

The Populist reform movement in Russia was a marginal movement because of its lack of organization. Populism was an ideology brought to Russia by the army's involvement in the Napoleonic Wars. Populism in Russia evolved from 1815 until 1861. With the emancipation of the serfs in 1861 the movement became popular with the intelligentsia. The populist movement grew with the intelligentsia's recognition of the lack of representation of the serfs' in the local and national government. Alexander I. Herzen's populism movement attempted to bring socialism to Russia's peasants in the 1870's by introducing peasant farming communes.¹ The Populist movement never solidified into a party or organization; its advocates were unable to bring a constituent base of peasants together to challenge the Tsar. A substantial populist party, with the support of the peasantry, had the potential to change Russia. Instead, without a significant party, the populist movement failed and out of populism grew Russia's socialist movement. Many small socialist groups exerted influence the outcome of the eventual Russian socialist revolution.

Of the many, small socialist groups formed in Russia during the 18th century, Marxist and non-Marxist, *Narodnaya Volya* would be a key influence on Lenin's socialist theories. *Narodnaya Volya* was an influential populist movement in Russia before that combined populism, Marxism, and Blanquism² before Marx and Engel's *Communist Manifesto* was introduced to Russia in 1882. *Narodnaya Volya's* socialist status is debated among scholars; its populist and socialist agenda is beyond the scope of this paper. *Narodnaya Volya*, or People's Will, was a radical, terroristic, party that grew out of the frustration of failed reformist movements that did not use violence. *Narodnaya*

¹ David MacKenzie and Michael W. Curran, *A History of Russia, the Soviet Union, and Beyond*, (Belmont, CA: West/Wadsworth publishing, 1999), 349-350.

² Mackenzie, 351.

Volya used violence to try and collapse the autocracy and force political revolution in Russia. *Narodnaya Volya* succeeded in assassinating on Tsar Alexander II in 1881,³ and attempted to assassinate another, Alexander III.⁴ *Narodnaya Volya's* goals had been stated in a letter to Alexander III two days after his father's assassination in 1881:

Speaking to the Emperor as to 'a citizen and a man of honor,' the Committee sets forth the measures that would make it abdicate as a revolutionary body. They are two: political amnesty and the calling of a Constituent Assembly charged with the task of 'reviewing the existing forms of political and social life and altering them in accordance with the people's wishes.' Also, to insure freedom of elections, civil liberties must be granted....⁵

In this letter you see the influences of Liberalism and populism. This letter preceded the attempts on Alexander III's life and showed the measures presented in *Narodnaya Volya's* doctrine, which was founded on doctrine set forth by Peter Tkachev.⁶ Tkachev believed that

...the masses must be led by a centralized, elite organization of revolutionaries, a disciplined party able to impose its will...Unless revolution came soon, capitalism would destroy the *mir* [peasant commune].⁷

Narodnaya Volya believed that the destruction of the *mir* had the ability to erase the basis for socialism that had developed within Russia. He stated that after the takeover a temporary dictatorship would be necessary until the masses were educated about socialism to preserve Russia's society. Tkachev believed that armed revolution was necessary and advocated assassination and other terrorist tactics to spread his message. He preached his message until he went insane; his beliefs would greatly influence later reformists.

³ Avrahm Yarmaolinsky, *Road to Revolution*. (Toronto: Collier Books, 1969), 267-274.

⁴ Yarmaolinsky, 317-320.

⁵ Yarmaolinsky, 281.

⁶ Albert L. Weeks, *The First Bolshevik, a Political Biography of Peter Tkachev* (New York: New York University Press, 1968), 27-31.

⁷ MacKenzie, 351.

Russia's socialist parties were small, insignificant factions within Russia until 1898. In 1898 the Russian Marxists came together to form the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party bringing a unified version of communism to Russia. The Russian Social Democratic Labor Party was the predecessor to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The first congress of the Party was held in Minsk, Belarus;⁸ all the members of that first congress were arrested soon after the meeting. The arrests were an abysmal beginning for the party that would soon bring political and social changes to Russia. Very soon after the first congress a young man by the name Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov, later known as V.I. Lenin, joined the party.

Lenin had many Russian socialist influences during his life; the group that his brother was a part of when he was executed for attempting the assassination of the Tsar, *Narodnaya Volya*, inspired Lenin's writings. The parallels between Lenin's Bolshevism and Tkachevism are apparent in *What Is to Be Done?* and *State and Revolution*. Alexander Herzen's socialist ideas influenced the way Lenin dealt with the question of the education of peasants. Lenin took his ideology to the peasants after the 1917 revolution much like the populists who attempted to influence the peasants by working the fields alongside them. Liberalism inspired Lenin's beliefs of a representative governing body and universal suffrage. These Russian movements and Marxism influenced Lenin's socialist ideologies for reform in Russia. Lenin's socialist theories would split the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party over his belief in an instigated violent revolution. Lenin mixes the violent ideology of *Narodnaya Volya*, the populists' appeal to the masses, Liberalism's reformist ideologies, and Marx's utopian communist

⁸ Commission of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U., *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)*. (New York: International Publishers, 1939), 21.

vision in his Bolshevik party doctrine which he presents in *What Is to Be Done?* and *State and Revolution*.

The varying social movements to reform Russia prior to 1917 were all unsuccessful. The Liberals lacked support of the peasants and was mainly a party of the nobility within Russia. Populism relied too much on intellectuals and also lacked any solid support of the peasantry. The early socialist movements in Russia limited themselves to the small working class in Russia. All of these movements attempted to reform Russia with no real organization or structure for the common Russian to identify with. This lack of structure and organization would not aid the Liberal, Socialist, or Populist movements in their quest to change Russia to a representative society.

Russia's movements for social change were ineffectual in changing Russia into representative government. From 1613 to February, 1917, Russia was ruled by the autocratic Romanov dynasty, the Romanov family had ruled absolutely according to Byzantine tradition⁹ of despotism.¹⁰ This Byzantine tradition was mixed with the idea that the Tsar owned all of Russia in the medieval feudal, patrimonial tradition.¹¹ These two beliefs shaped the growth of Russia from 1613 until the overthrow of the monarchy in 1917. The last two Tsars, Alexander III and Nicholas II, used these traditions and beliefs to try and uphold the personal rule of the Tsar and limit the growth of a bureaucratic system that would limit the Tsar's power. *What Is to Be Done?* and *State and Revolution* provided the basis for a centralized, well-organized revolutionary

⁹ Orlando Figes, *A People's Tragedy: The Russian Revolution 1891-1924*, (New York: Penguin Group, 1998), 7

¹⁰ The Byzantine despot tradition embodied a country's ruler as God in human form. The ruler should be allowed to rule unfettered by laws or a bureaucracy. The Tsar was supposed to rule according to his consciousness, his sense of duty, and what he thought was wrong or right.

¹¹ Figes, 7.

movement focused on changing Russia from its traditional autocracy to any kind of representative government.

Lenin's essays *What Is to Be Done?* and *State and Revolution* express a desire to change Russia into a society based on his blend of socialism, Tkachevism, and Populism. *What Is to Be Done?* and *State and Revolution* became the blueprint of Russian Communism in the 20th century; without these two documents Lenin might not have been the influence he was within Russia. Out of these two essays emerged Russia's only successful revolutionary movement that was able to change Russia from the old agrarian society into the new industrialized society.

Scholars of many different disciplines have examined Lenin's writings and emphasized their call for organization, the creation of a vanguard party, and centralization of the Marxists in Russia. Scholars that examine *What Is to Be Done?* and *State and Revolution*, describe them as two of his most influential works due to the changes they helped bring about in Russia's socialism and society. Out of those two writings authors see the basis for Bolshevik doctrine materialize. Due to the 15 years between the two documents most authors examine the two documents separately. In these examinations authors look at the two documents in two separate ways. The authors either view *What Is to Be Done?* as a revolutionary Marxist document dealing with the education of a countries proletariat and creating a party whose goal was to bring socialism to a state, or *What Is to Be Done?* is viewed as an organizational essay calling for the centralization of Marxist activities in Russia underneath a group of professional revolutionaries. *State and Revolution* is seen by scholars either as the blueprint for

Lenin's attempt to "smash the state" or as a profound deviation from true Marxist doctrine to establish a dictatorship of the Bolshevik Party in Russia.

Lars T. Lih examines *What Is to Be Done?*, and sees the essay as an answer to the question of how to educate workers and peasants about Marxism. Lih acknowledges in his article "How a Founding Document Was Found" that *What Is to Be Done?* is an organizational essay, Lih sees the text as a

... pep talk to the *praktiki*. It is half-time and the team is not doing as well as it should, so the coach tells them in the locker room: come on, guys, you look terrible out there! I know you can do better than that- I know you can accomplish miracles! All it takes is some attitude adjustment. Think big, dare to win! We can't afford to lose this one, so get out there and show me what you can do!¹²

Lih sees the text as Lenin's attempt to energize the Socialist educators who were losing confidence in the workers they were trying to educate. Socialism was relatively new to Russia and struggling to become a legitimate social movement within Russia. His look at *What Is to Be Done?* shows us a document that deals with raising the consciousness of the proletariat by addressing those who are trying to educate them.

Organization was needed for the education of the workers. *What Is to Be Done?* gave instructions on how to organize party cells to implement that education. Clair Clark explains that

...the party was seeking a political revolution, not just an economic revolution, a broadly-based, relatively open, trade-union type of organization would quickly fail in the struggle against the Tsarist autocracy. Rather, Lenin urged, there must be an organization of *professional* revolutionaries, in constant contact with the workers, guiding but not representative of them.¹³

This type of organization would allow Lenin's Bolshevik agenda to spread rapidly and be more effective. Clark explains that Lenin's goal was to "...give the workers class consciousness" and to "...organize the party as a collective consciousness and a rigidly

¹² Lars T. Lih, "How a Founding Document Was Found, or One Hundred Years of Lenin's 'What Is to Be Done?,'" *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 4, no. 1 (Winter 2003): 47

¹³ Claire Clark, "Lenin the Revolutionary," *Melbourne Historical Journal*, 9, (1970): 26

centralized vanguard.”¹⁴ Clark sees *What Is to Be Done?* as Lenin’s view on how to organize and implement Bolshevik education, and as an over-all organizational essay. Lih’s view is Lenin is specifically addressing his revolutionary educators to organize them and make their efforts more efficient.

Organization was the key to the success of the Bolshevik movement. Without efficient, strict organization the Bolshevik movement may never have gained the control it had over the Russian people. Henry M. Christman looks at *What Is to Be Done?* as Lenin’s blueprint for the basic Bolshevik doctrine. He points out that *What Is to Be Done?* states that the revolution is a movement of both workers and intellectuals. Christman points out that “Lenin believed that revolution must be carefully and systematically planned and carried through; he scorned those who anticipated “spontaneous” revolution by the people themselves.”¹⁵ Essentially Lenin gives a manual for Bolshevik organizers on how to go about organizing their efforts to further the efforts of the party. While Christman views *What Is to Be Done?* as a manual, Clark sees the document as laying out how Lenin wants to organize the socialist party, and Lih looks at *What Is to Be Done?* as the answer to the revolutionaries’ need for organization to aid in the education of the masses.

Lenin’s *What Is to Be Done?* is unusually open-ended. The document describes how to organize a revolution and how to plan for that revolution, but it does not explain how to implement the revolution its followers are to plan for. Lenin’s belief in organization and preparation would not allow him to leave his plan for carrying out the Bolshevik revolution go unwritten. In 1917 Lenin finally addressed how to implement a

¹⁴ Clark, 26.

¹⁵ Vladimir I. Lenin, *Essential Works Of Lenin, “What Is to Be Done?” and Other Writings*, ed. Henry M. Christman (New York: Dover Publications, INC. 1987), 53-54

Leninist socialist revolution with *State and Revolution*. Scholars view this document as Lenin's deviation from Marxism and his plan to build an economic and social system by way of Leninist revolution. Or *State and Revolution* completes his Leninist doctrine and gives his plan to destroy any kind of democratic system within a state to implement a socialist agenda and build a Leninist state.

Scholars generally view *State and Revolution* as Lenin's work that had the most impact on his followers. Within its pages Lenin described how to destroy a Western democracy and implement a socialist, Leninist based system through active, violent revolution. Christman observes that *S&R* brings forth the idea that "...Leninists cannot participate in democracy for any purpose other than to destroy it."¹⁶ In his analysis of *State and Revolution* Christman points out that Lenin "...rejects not only capitalist, but also all Western political forms and institutions..."¹⁷ Christman sees *State and Revolution* as a prediction for Lenin's revolution and his building of the new Russian state.

Mel Rothenberg has a different view of *State and Revolution* than Christman. Rothenberg states that Lenin's view of the state in *State and Revolution* is it is an entity in a "...period of transition."¹⁸ Rothenberg explains that in Lenin's push to destroy the democratic system in Russia to build his socialist, Leninist state, *State and Revolution* explains how to counter a bourgeoisie liberal democracy and institute a centralized socialist system. Rothenberg's analysis of *State and Revolution* views the work as Lenin's blueprint to counter capitalism and democracy to build a socialist state, rushing through the capitalism stage when the state experiences class struggle; as stated within

¹⁶ Lenin, 271.

¹⁷ Lenin, 271.

¹⁸ Mel Rothenberg, "Lenin on the State," *Science & Society* 59, no. 3 (Fall 1995): 419

Marx and Engel's Communist Manifesto.¹⁹ While Christman sees *State and Revolution* as Lenin's prediction that Socialism and Western-style democracy cannot co-exist.

The varying analyses of *What Is to Be Done?* and *State and Revolution* are important. They show us the differing views scholars have regarding the two documents. Lih looks at *What Is to Be Done?* as a document describing how to educate people for the advancement of Marxism, others like Clark and Christman see it as an organizational document. *State and Revolution* is seen in two ways; Rothenberg sees it as a blueprint on how to smash a non-socialist state as an organizational document for the Bolshevik party, while Christman sees *State and Revolution* as a prediction by Lenin of what the future holds for Russian socialism. They also highlight the historical importance of the two documents; they became the basis of his ideology.

These analyses point out the strengths and weaknesses of the two documents; their continuity of the main ideas, like strict organization and centralization, strengthens them, while the variation from "true" Marxism weakens them. But none of the scholars analyze the documents together. When comparing the two documents many scholars see obvious similarities and glaring differences. One reason that a close comparison has not been done is the varying times of publication; the essays were written 15 years apart. By examining the context of the writings an argument can be made that the two belong side by side.

Lenin wrote *What Is to Be Done?* in 1902 before the 1903 Russian Social Democratic Labour Party's second congress where Lenin presented the paper to his fellow Marxists. *What Is to Be Done?* was written by Lenin during his exile to Siberia,

¹⁹ Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, ed. Martin Malia (New York, NY: Penguin Group, 1998), 56-65.

and while he was traveling throughout Europe after his exile ended. Lenin's beliefs separated his followers from the main party's beliefs. Among many other points Lenin disputed the requirements for party membership, due to his beliefs about the party and its membership the party split into two factions; the Mensheviks (Minoritarians) and the Bolsheviks (Majoritarians).²⁰ The Bolsheviks were led by Lenin, and adhered to the theories he laid out in *What Is to Be Done?*. They organized themselves along Lenin's prescribed lines and the core of the party, the Central Committee, issued orders to the rest of the party. The Mensheviks believed in traditional Marxism. The Mensheviks wanted to follow a path similar to that of the German Social Democrats and attempt to change Russia from within the current system.

What Is to Be Done? examines the problem of how to educate workers in an industrial society. The purpose of educating workers was to elevate their class consciousness. This education makes workers aware of the situation in which they toil; once this was accomplished Lenin believed a socialist revolution would occur. Lenin saw the problem as the fact that the workers were not conscious of their position. Lenin's believed that

“...the strength of a modern movement lies in the awakening of the masses(principally, the industrial proletariat), and that its weakness lies in the lack of consciousness and initiative among the revolutionary leaders.”

Lenin explained that workers don't know that they are exploited by the capitalist class, and therefore their consciousness must be raised. A revolutionary group is needed to raise the working class' consciousness.

²⁰ Figes, 151-152.

How does someone change an entire social class's consciousness? To do so, the social class must be educated to realize that they are being exploited. Lenin believed the Russian Social Democratic Party had lost its focus

It was not so much the downright rejection of "grand phrases" that the heroes of this period engaged in as in the "vulgarization" of these phrases: scientific socialism ceased to be an integral revolutionary theory and became a hodge-podge idea "freely" diluted with the contents of every new German textbook that appeared; the slogan "class struggle" did not impel them forward to wider and more strenuous activity but served as a soothing syrup, because the "economic struggle is inseparably linked up with the political struggle"; the idea of a party did not serve as a call for the creation of a militant organization of revolutionaries, but was used to justify some sort of a "revolutionary bureaucracy" and infantile playing at "democratic" forms.²¹

Lenin believed that if socialists maintained their revolutionary goals workers realizing their situation, workers would become aware of the oppression the capitalist class was forcing upon them. In order to educate the workers on class position and conflict, a group of focused, professional revolutionaries were needed.

Professional revolutionaries were seen by Lenin as necessary to challenge well organized capitalist governments. These revolutionaries would be chosen from among the workers and students. Lenin states that "...no movement can be durable without a stable organization of leaders to maintain continuity."²² Lenin's revolutionaries would be well trained and highly organized, much like the governments they meant to topple. "...the organization must consist chiefly of persons engaged in revolutionary activities as a profession."²³ Therefore this small group formed the core of the revolutionary group, made executive decisions, and led the revolution. This became the basic idea behind war communism; it is also the basis for a "vanguard party."

²¹ Lenin, 175.

²² Lenin, 147.

²³ Lenin, 148.

The idea of a vanguard party leading the way into communism was preposterous to most orthodox Marxists. They believed that such a party would lead to a dictatorship of the few elites over the workers. The ideal socialist revolution is the working class rising up as one to challenge the controlling capitalist class. If the workers were able to defeat the capitalists then they would control their destinies. Lenin initiated his unique strain of communism in order to challenge the Russian autocratic state, and to prepare to fight what he saw as an inescapable war against other capitalist countries who would challenge the revolution. The end of World War I proved Lenin right as the Allies supported his opponents and landed troops in Russia to protect their holdings.

The vanguard party's struggle to raise the consciousness of the country's workers was necessary to fight trade unionism. Lenin's observation of Germany's Social Democratic Labor Party's transformation into an organization willing to cooperate with an imperialist government to change Germany from within was highly critical.²⁴ Lenin believed that in order to create a socialist state the socialist party must work outside the oppressive system that it exists in. Lenin viewed the Germans as traitors to Marxism for conceding its revolutionary status to work within Germany's political system to change Germany. Working with imperialists and capitalists, although for change, was impossible for Lenin to conceive.

What Is to Be Done? explains how Lenin planned to preempt what he viewed as conspiracy with the enemy in Russia. His goal was to educate Russian citizens and Marxists to prevent cooperation with imperialists and capitalists. This education would ready Russian socialists for the revolution that Lenin thought was approaching Russia,

²⁴ For further explanation see; Gunther Roth. *The Social Democrats in Imperial Germany*. Totowa, New Jersey: The Bedminster Press, 1984.

and lead to a socialist government. The first challenge for Lenin's revolutionary party theory was the 1905 Russian revolution.

From 1905-1917 Lenin shaped his socialist theories, these changes would impact the way he brought socialism to Russia. Lenin observed the political changes within Russia, the weakening of the Tsar, and the ineptitude of Russia's politicians. World War I changed the country even further, the Tsar's government was critically weakened by incompetence and defeat on the battlefields. The support that the Tsar had prior to the war vanished with the unpopular decisions regarding Russia's direction in the war. The most important influence on Lenin during this time period was his travels in Europe and his struggles within the party. All of these events greatly influenced Lenin and helped to shape his socialist theories.

In 1905 Russia experienced its first major political upheaval. In the wake of the unsuccessful and unpopular 1904 Russo-Japanese war, discontent regarding the current Tsar, Nicholas II, was at its height. In early January 1905 15,000 peasants marched peacefully to the winter palace to confront the Tsar. Instead of receiving the peaceful column led by a religious Tsarist supporter; Father Gapon,²⁵ the crowd was fired upon by the Tsar's troops. 200 dead and 800 wounded,²⁶ in what would come to be known as Bloody Sunday, inspired strikes and protests throughout Russia's cities and eventually spread to the Russian countryside. The uprising forced the Tsar to sue Japan for peace, and in October 1905 Tsar Nicholas II agreed to create a representative assembly.ⁱ

During December 1905 both the Mensheviks and Bolsheviks staged strikes and began to arm workers. By the 10th of December 1905 Moscow had become a

²⁵ Lenin, 171.

²⁶ Lenin, 178.

“battleground” according to Aleksii Gorky.²⁷ By the 12th of December 1905 rebel armies controlled good portions of the city and the railway stations. But with the arrival of military reinforcements the attempted uprising was defeated and many party members were arrested. The Tsar’s formation of the Duma briefly consoled the 1905 revolutionaries.

Despite the creation of a representative legislative body, Tsar Nicholas II had no intention of relinquishing any of his powers. In his Fundamental Laws, released in April 1906,²⁸ the Tsar made clear his view that he was still in control of Russia. Constitutional Articles like Article 5, “the person of the Tsar is sacred and inviolable,”²⁹ gave Nicholas II supremacy over the Duma and any laws it created. With its power limited, the Duma’s inability to adequately represent average Russians quickly became all too apparent. Even with the newly granted Duma the Bolshevik party planned an armed insurrection, one not intended to seize power but instead to “...The point is not about victory but about giving the regime a shake and attracting the masses to the movement.....”³⁰ as put by V.I. Lenin after the failure of the 1905 revolution.

Despite the failure of the December Revolution, the Marxists had gained the attention and notoriety they desired. The revolution had shaken the Tsarist regime as intended by Lenin and the other Bolshevik leaders. After the October Manifesto and the December Revolution the Duma appeared to have the power desired by political reformists within Russia; in reality the Tsar maintained his hold on Russia. Socialist

²⁷ Lenin, 200.

²⁸ Lenin, 215.

²⁹ James Harvey Robinson and Charles Beard, *Readings in Modern European History*. (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1908), 378-381.

³⁰ Figes, 199.

leaders who were not satisfied with the apparent political victory continued to push for social revolution.

The first hint of the Duma's lack of power came 72 days after the first assembly was called. On the 8th of July 1906 the Tsar dissolved the new Duma³¹ and called for new elections for the following year's session.³² Political reform favored by the Kadets, a party that favored political reforms but not social revolution, was not achieved during the sessions of the first and second Dumas. Instead the Dumas of 1906 and 1907 were used as propaganda tools by the Tsarists supporters and the Marxist factions.³³

At the beginning of the 1905 revolution Lenin was in Geneva, Switzerland.³⁴ When his comrades in Russia called for him to join them he left Geneva behind and entered Russia with forged passport papers. He stayed in Russia through the failure of the 1905 revolution until 1907 when, for safety reasons, he moved to Finland. From the end of the revolution in 1906 until his move in 1907 Lenin was fighting for leadership within the Bolsheviks. Many Russian Socialists wanted to mend the rift between the Menshevik and Bolshevik factions, Lenin was still adamant in his view that professional revolutionaries were needed to raise the consciousness of the working class. After a short struggle Lenin's ideology was maintained and the organizational apparatus of the party

³¹ Figes, 220.

³² The year 1905 was riddled with worker strikes and peasant uprisings. The Tsar had to use the army to put down these strikes and rebellions, by October 1905 the army became disgruntled and mutiny was more likely than ever. With the country on the verge of chaos the Tsar's advisors turned to Count Witte to present the Duma plan. Initially Nicholas II refused and attempted to appoint a dictator, but resistance from his chosen dictator and from Count Witte finally convinced the Tsar to reluctantly create the legislative body. The creation unjustly gave Nicholas II the image of an 'enlightened Tsar'.

³³ Figes, ch. 6; "Last Hopes."

³⁴ Robert Service, *Lenin: A Biography*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2000), pg. 167.

was kept separate from the rest of the party, it was at this time a secret Bolshevik Centre was established.³⁵

Lenin stayed in Finland until 1908 when he relocated to Stockholm, once again on the run from Tsarist agents. In Stockholm Lenin continued to dictate policy to the party, his lifestyle was funded by royalties from his books and the party funds, which came from armed robberies and legacies. From Stockholm Lenin toured Europe lecturing and meeting with other Bolsheviks about party policy. He was competing with Alexander Bogdanov for control of the party. In 1909 at a Bolshevik conference in Paris Lenin forced Bogdanov out of the party³⁶ and he became the premier theorist in the Bolshevik party. This placed all actions of the party firmly under his control where he was free to exert his principles on his followers.

The period of 1909 until 1914 Lenin spent solidifying the Bolshevik organization into a revolutionary party, through his representatives in Russia who communicated with him while he traveled around Europe and attended Russian socialist conferences. Then in 1914, the World War broke out, Lenin was in Poland at the time and was imprisoned in Nowy Targ. After his release in August 1914 Lenin and his family moved to Switzerland to avoid anti-Russian persecution and the advancing Tsarist imperial army.³⁷ From 1914 until 1917 Lenin spent his time in Switzerland trying to undermine the Russian war effort and speaking out against the German Social Democratic Party's support of the war.

Lenin saw the World War as an imperialist, bourgeoisie conflict spurred by capitalist forces within the participating countries. His essay *Imperialism the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, which was published in early 1916, argues that World War I was a

³⁵ Service, 180.

³⁶ Service, 192-197.

³⁷ Service, 224-225.

capitalist war that was the result of conflicts over territorial ambitions of capitalist governments. During the decades prior to the war the world was becoming divided by spheres of influence. European governments sought to extend their control by colonialism. The colonies of Europe would come into conflict, especially in Africa and Asia, in order to expand for their sponsoring country. The governments of the world were created by capitalists to further their ambitions and profits. These capitalists sought to gain national blocks of capital, or buy into government, to expand their interests and drive up profits. These capitalist governments did not support workers, many of whom already lived in oppression or poverty. The spheres of capitalist influence would grow until the entire world's population would be living in poverty.

Tsarist Russia's support of the war led to a rapid degeneration of the absolute authority it maintained over the working class and peasantry. Initial successes at Galicia and Lvov³⁸ would be overshadowed by tragic defeats at Tannenberg and Masurian Lakes.³⁹ Bad decision-making, industrially and militarily, led to shortages of munitions and supplies for the army.⁴⁰ As conditions on the front deteriorated the army's moral fell apart and eventually allow it to become a mob favoring revolutionary change within Russia.

As the World War plodded on Russian casualties rose, by the end of the war in 1918 over 12 million Russian men had been mobilized. Of those 12 million men 1.7 million lost their lives,⁴¹ staggering losses like these coupled with the shortage of bread and fuel in Russian cities would spark riots that would turn into a revolution. On the 25th

³⁸ Service, 255.

³⁹ Service, 256.

⁴⁰ Service, 261-262.

⁴¹ Harry Rusche, "The Human Cost," <http://www.english.emory.edu/LostPoets/Casualties.html> (accessed 17 April 2007).

of February 1917 a crowd faced a squadron of Cossacks near where, in 1905, Tsarist troops fired on a crowd of peaceful protestors during Bloody Sunday. Over the next few days Tsarist troops fired upon civilians, but more and more soldiers began joining the protestors. Before long regiments of soldiers had mutinied and joined the revolution.⁴² Despite the obvious revolutionary ardor in the streets socialist leaders did not believe that the revolution was imminent, “What revolution? Give the workers a pound of bread and the movement will peter out.” said the leading Bolshevik in the capital.⁴³

With the revolution underway in February 1917 Lenin was still in Switzerland. In March the Bolshevik situation in Russia clearly needed a leader, and in April 1917 Lenin traveled across Germany and entered Russia.⁴⁴ During the trip Lenin composed his *April Thesis* which denounced the Provisional Government and encouraged a Bolshevik led socialist revolution. The Provisional government which he railed against was led by the Menshevik faction of Russia’s Socialists. Lenin’s encouragement of a Bolshevik uprising gained him many enemies in Russia; Mensheviks and Tsarist supporters used his crossing of Germany to suggest that he was a German agent.⁴⁵ Despite support from many Marxists including Leon Trotsky, lack of popular support mad it so Lenin was unable to implement a successful Bolshevik revolution in July of 1917 and he was forced to flee to Finland. In Finland Lenin composed an essay that, along with *What Is to Be Done?*, laid out how the Bolsheviks would organize and carryout the revolution, and how the Bolshevik Party would bring socialism to Russia. That essay, *State and Revolution*, influenced Bolshevik politics until the fall of the communist government in 1989.

⁴² Figes, 313-315.

⁴³ Figes, 311.

⁴⁴ Service, 256-261.

⁴⁵ Service, 278.

With the revolution fast approaching Russia, Lenin needed to define what to do in the event of a successful revolution. The essay *State and Revolution* was his plan to Russia to accept his vision of Marxism to replace the provisional government. First, though, he addressed the problem of the state's relationship to the capitalist class. Lenin saw the governments in countries like England and Germany as extensions of the capitalist sectors. He believed that the governments were the tool of the capitalist class's expansion, created by capitalists to serve capitalist interests. The government is the "executive committee" of the bourgeoisie passing favorable legislation and regulations to further capitalist interests.

Lenin believed that once people recognized the contradiction between the capitalist and the working class and the desire to foment a revolution in order to create a workers paradise would become prevalent in the society. There were four steps to the revolution according to Lenin. First comes the realization of the state's role as the capitalist class's executive committee; Lenin defined the state as an organ of class oppression and exploitation. Second war must be made against the oppressive governmental system and the capitalist class, effectively smashing the executive committee. Once the executive committee is smashed, the state will wither away leaving a socialist state advocating democracy as the third step. The final step is the "dictatorship of the proletariat," in which workers dictate to the bourgeoisie what to produce and how to produce it.

Lenin attacked the provisional Menshevik government after his arrival in Russia in April 1917, claiming that their continued support of the World War, which he viewed as a capitalist war, and their commitment to liberal reforms were bourgeoisie policies.

Lenin proposed creating a vanguard party to lead Russia through capitalism into socialism. Much like the professional revolutionaries he described in *What Is to Be Done?*, the party would be a highly disciplined, paramilitary group rigidly controlled from the center. The organization would embrace the common Russian citizen, and in turn the common Russian citizen would embrace the organization.

The provisional government formed by the Menshevik party under Alexander Kerensky has been devoted to liberal reforms. The Allies in World War I promised the fledgling Russian Government support if it maintained the large Russian front. The desire shared by Russian civilians to pull out of the war gave Lenin all the leverage he needed. Kerensky wanted to cooperate with capitalists to create a working class and a situation in which traditional Marxism was possible. Lenin railed against the Mensheviks for their cooperation with the capitalist class, this in his eyes made the provisional government inherently capitalist like any other capitalist country, therefore illegitimate.

State and Revolution seems to justify taking power from the Mensheviks by force and instituting Bolshevik party rule in Russia. This justification helps to lend legitimacy to Lenin's government in the eyes of Russia's citizenry. *State and Revolution* describes Lenin's distrust of ballot box reform, he saw the failure of the German Social democratic Labor Party to reform through the ballot box as evidence to the inefficiency of the system. In Lenin's eyes liberal elections are capitalist by nature and they do not encourage socialism.

Legitimacy was what Lenin had been seeking for his socialist vision all along. Beginning in 1902 with *What Is to Be Done?* Lenin offered up his vision of how to change Russia into a legitimate socialist state, specifically his strain of Marxism. In 1917

he continued that search for legitimacy with *State and Revolution*. Both documents presented party organization and the vanguard party model. *What Is to Be Done?*'s vanguard party is for education of the proletariat. *State and Revolution*'s vanguard would be the whole Bolshevik party itself. The Party would be responsible for leading Russia through capitalism into communism. The party itself was the vanguard entity that Lenin spoke of in both his papers. The function of the party was changed due to the events surrounding Russia at the time, but both essays revolved around the party. Both *What Is to Be Done?* and *State and Revolution* insisted on the centralization of the party and its activities. This centralization aided Lenin and his Bolshevization of Russia, but the reliance on this centralized entity would have disastrous results.

The emphasis of both *What Is to Be Done?* and *State and Revolution* is organization. Without organization Lenin realized that socialism would fail in any country. In *What Is to Be Done?* the organization is aimed at cadres of Marxists working to educate workers and raise their consciousness. This education would be used to enlighten workers about the benefits that Marxism would bring to their lives through a representative, socialist government. *State and Revolution*'s organization was aimed at smashing the state entity to instill the discipline necessary to challenge a capitalist government in a physical, violent revolution. The organization provided by both writings was essential to successful Bolshevik revolution in 1917; prior to 1917 the populists and liberals had failed with little to no organization and the Menshevik Marxists would loose out to the militarily organized Bolsheviks in 1917. With the dissention caused by the World War aiding the Bolsheviks takeover, by promising immediate reform their popularity rose and gave them the numbers to challenge the provisional government,

What Is to Be Done? and *State and Revolution* gave the party purpose, direction, and legitimacy. Lenin took a relatively unorganized group of socialists and turned them into an organized, efficient party capable of the revolution that he foresaw.

This issue of organization in both essays was aimed at the vanguard party theory. In *What Is to Be Done?* Lenin intended the vanguard party to be an instrument of education. The party would be organized into cadres of "...persons engaged in revolutionary activities as a profession."⁴⁶ The revolutionary activities consisted of undermining the Tsar's regime and bringing people to the cause through education. This education was taking place in a hostile environment; all Marxists were outlawed under the Tsarist regime. These educators not only had to be knowledgeable, they also had to be stealthy and efficient. Without those attributes they would be caught and prosecuted by the ruling autocracy.

State and Revolution's organization was aimed at destroying all vestiges of a society that was not Marxist or Leninist. The vanguard was composed of political Leninists who were to guide Russia through the revolutionary stages and capitalism into socialism. These men had to be willing to sacrifice their lives for the good of the party. This sacrifice would bring Russia through the stages of society laid out by Marx and Lenin to the utopian society that was envisioned by Lenin.

Both *What Is to Be Done?* and *State and Revolution* had separate objectives for the vanguard party. *What Is to Be Done?* and *S&R* can be seen as the mission statement for the Bolsheviks during 1902 and 1917, respectively. Put them together and Lenin's plan for Bolshevism in Russia is evident. With the organization of the party under the vanguard complete Lenin addresses who would direct the vanguard. From the center of

⁴⁶ Lenin, 148.

the party which, was secret at first, the central committee would direct the actions of the vanguard party.

The centralization of party power was central to both papers. Lenin's believed that the efficient spread of Bolshevism is possible through tight control of the party from the central committee, with rigid discipline the party could create his vision for Russia similar to the way an army fights a war. His Menshevik and Bolshevik opponents criticized him because his belief that the Central Committee should function in secret. Their belief was that a secret central committee would limit the effectiveness of the party. His rebuttal to their opposition in *What Is to Be Done?* argues for eventual centralization in all facets of Russian life, and the continued secrecy of certain functions of the Party;

The centralization of the more secret functions in an organization of revolutionaries will not diminish, but rather increase the extent and the quality of the activity of a large number of other organizations intended for wide membership and which, therefore, can be as loose and public as possible, for example, trade unions, workers' circles for self-education and the reading of illegal literature, and the socialist and also democratic circles for *all other sections of the population*, etc., etc.⁴⁷

Lenin believed that centralization and secrecy would promote the quick, efficient spread of Bolshevism.

State and Revolution's centralization had an entirely different intent. The need for centralization was to direct the violent revolution necessary to replace a bourgeois state with a proletarian state.⁴⁸ This centralization was necessary to direct the revolutionary actions of the different branches of revolutionary activity taking place. Without centralization the revolution had the opportunity to fail, much like the failure of the Provisional Government's failure in the face of

⁴⁷ Lenin, 149.

⁴⁸ Lenin, 285.

Bolshevism. The successful October Revolution reinforced the need for a central authority to smash the entity Lenin referred to as the state.

Though written 15 years apart, *What Is to Be Done?* and *State and Revolution* have many similarities. These similarities show Lenin's program holds to the same ideas of organization and centralization over time, and gives much needed legitimacy in the eyes of Russia's citizenry to the Bolsheviks during a time of social upheaval when Russians were seeking a stable government. Both call for organization of the party into a vanguard entity to challenge the state. Once the party was organized, power would be centralized, to conduct revolutionary activities or to challenge the existing state ultimate power, in terms of the party, lay in the hands of the men at the center. This type of power would be ominous for Russia's future.

With the Bolshevik takeover in October 1917, Russia's future revolved around Lenin. Lenin's support of a centralized state was his way of shepherding Russia through the capitalist phase of societal evolution presented by Marx. His feeling was that the party's guidance could bring Russia rapidly through this phase and allow the country into his utopian vision for Russia. But Lenin's centralization was the downfall of his vision; power from the center would ultimately pervert Lenin's vision and form an authoritarian society under Joseph Stalin.

The need for centralization was re-enforced by the beginning of Russia's civil war in 1918. The Bolsheviks not only fought the forces that wanted to re-install the Tsar or a similar autocratic figure, they were also threatened by an

intervening force of the World War allies at Archangelsk⁴⁹ and Vladivostok.⁵⁰

The presence of foreign troops on Russian soil strengthened the resolve of the Bolsheviks, the allies voicing their support of the Bolshevik's Russian opponents in the civil war rallied peasant support to the Bolsheviks. From 1918-1921 during the Civil War the Bolsheviks centralized all facets of Russian life to make fighting the war more efficient for the fledgling Bolshevik government. In 1918 Lenin named Leon Trotsky the "People's Commissar for War"⁵¹ and the chain of command was created. With Lenin at the top and his commissars laid out below him in a rigid, militarily inspired command structure. This was the format for war communism. The use of this rigid command structure continued until the Bolshevik regime faced violent uprising in 1924. In 1924 Lenin changed his policy until only the Party and the military was highly centralized. The centralization of the party in response to civil war Lenin opened the avenue for a Leninist dictator in the future.

Russia's centralization under Lenin allowed one man to rule Russia much like the Tsar had before the 1917 revolution. Lenin's centralization of power in Russia was two-fold. First it was to make the education of the masses easier in order to raise the consciousness of the oppressed classes in Russia, the peasants and workers. Then, during the 1918-1921 civil war, centralization served to create an easy flow of orders from the top down; an army would be unable to wage a successful war if the soldiers had to vote on every action taken by that army. A

⁴⁹ Figes, 573.

⁵⁰ Figes, 651.

⁵¹ Robert Conquest, *Stalin: Breaker of Nations*, (New York: Penguin Books, 1991), 78.

clear chain of command permits smooth communication and orders to travel along the chain of command.

The Bolsheviks rigid command structure, outlined in *What Is to Be Done?* to allow efficient education towards the foreseen revolution, transferred easily to Russian society. The transfer to a rigid system of control was unquestioned due to the former autocratic Tsarist regime, and because of the control needed to successfully fight the civil war. Once the Bolsheviks solidified their power in Russia leadership still came from one man, Lenin. Upon Lenin's death in 1924 a struggle commenced to replace him at the center of the party. By 1924 the Bolshevik party controlled Russia, the Central Committee (CC) dictated to the party. Lenin's successor, who would be at the center of the CC, carried enormous political influence within the CC. This position of power had been filled by Lenin, when the long struggle for succession ended in the late 1930's Stalin was at the center of the CC. From the dictatorship of a centralized party to the dictatorship of Stalin, Lenin's writings played a key role.

Lenin wrote *What Is to Be Done?* and *State and Revolution* to bring a vision of Marxism to Russia that he felt was compatible as swiftly as possible. He envisioned a utopian workers state where no bourgeoisie existed to oppress the workers. Lenin foresaw a society where workers would reap the rewards of their labor and live in relative harmony with each other. Despite his good intentions, Lenin's vision did not succeed due to the political conditions he left in Russia when he died. Despite his failure to secure socialism in Russia; Lenin's doctrine

survived him. His support of a highly organized, centralized party organ allowed men like Stalin to dominate Russia's politics after his death.

The importance of *What Is to Be Done?* and *State and Revolution* lies not in how they were used by Lenin to implement the 1917 revolution, but in how their doctrine was used after the civil war and after Lenin's death. After Russia's brutal civil war Lenin used his essays to maintain a rigid governmental system that received operational orders from the Central Committee. While Lenin was alive the Central Committee followed his orders, after his death the party's orders emanated from the Committee itself. The party's centralization allowed its orders to maintain consistency throughout the Bolshevik regime.

While centralization allowed for easy governing, it also made fighting wars more efficient. The organization and centralization of Russia's official government and military branches created an efficient, machine-like organism that the Central Committee was able to manipulate to maintain control. The efficiency of the Russian system aided in the victory over the Bolsheviks' opponents of the civil war, and it allowed the government and military to recover from initial defeats in World War I and drive the Nazis back into Germany. This efficiency allowed Russia to export its ideology to other countries after World War II and aid in the creation of the group of states that became the Soviet Block.

What Is to Be Done? and *State and Revolution* became the guidelines along which Lenin tried to bring his vision for Russia to the reform-hungry lower classes. Lenin's vision for Russia was a society that existed with no social class and no envy of others' possessions. Lenin saw his Russia as a utopian society that

accommodated the wants and needs of everyone within the society. He did not foresee the possibility of a takeover by a power-hungry individual, nor did he foresee the abuses of power, like the bloody purges that were committed by Stalin in the 1930's and 1940's. In his effort to free Russia from the autocratic rule of the Tsar Lenin formed a system that would allow a small, elite group of society to dictate the rest of society; exactly like the Tsars had done for 300 years.

For 300 years a monarchy had ruled Russia's agrarian society. A demanding, largely peasant population was looking for a stable, legitimate government to rule in its stead. The Bolsheviks organization allowed the Party to prevail in the political and military struggle for supremacy in Russia, while their rigid organization and command structure gave the peasantry what they were looking for in their government; someone to tell them what to do. The betrayal of Lenin's ideals for his vanguard was betrayed by the very man who envisioned the bright, Russian future. His blindness to the danger of centralization of power allowed men who sought power to fight for the right to wield such power. When the struggle for political supremacy ended in 1938, Stalin controlled Russia, and Lenin's vision was lost to a cruel dictatorship that killed many Russians and defamed socialism in Western society. While Lenin did not envision this outcome, his adaptation of Marxism into Leninism for Russia brought it about.

Bibliography-

- Brinkley, George. "Leninism: What it Was and What it Was Not." *Review of Politics*. 60, no. 1 (1998): 151-164
- Commission of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U., ed. *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)*. New York: International Publishers, 1939
- Christman, Henry M. *Essential Works of Lenin: "What Is to Be Done?" and Other Writings*. New York: Bantam Books, Inc. 1987.
- Clark, Claire. "Lenin the Revolutionary" *Melbourne Historical Journal*. no. 9 (1970): 25-29.
- Cohen, Stephan F. "Bukharin, Lenin and the Theoretical Foundations of Bolshevism." *Soviet Studies*. 21, no. 4: (1970) 436-457.
- Conquest, Robert. *Stalin: Breaker of Nations*. New York: Penguin Group. 1992.
- Ehrenberg, John. "Class Politics and The State: Lenin and the Contradictions of Socialism." *Science and Society*. 59, no. 3 (1995): 437-463.
- Evans, Alfred B. "Rereading Lenin's 'State and Revolution'" *Slavic Review*. 46, no. 1 (1987): 1-19.
- Farber, Samuel. "The Relevance of Lenin Today." *Science and Society*. 60, no. 1 (1996): 90-96.
- Fer'shtinski, Iuri. "The Mystery of Lenin's Death." *Russian Studies in History*. 46, no 3 (2003): 26-76.
- Figes, Orlando. *A People's Tragedy: The Russian Revolution 1891-1924*. New York: Penguin Group. 1998.
- Fitzpatrick, Sheila. *The Russian Revolution*. 3rd ed. New York: Oxford University Press. 1994.
- Hudis, Peter. "Developing a Philosophically Grounded Alternative to Capitalism." *Socialism and Democracy*. 19, no. 2 (2005): 91-98.
- Krylova, Anna. Beyond the Spontaneity-Consciousness Paradigm: "Class Instinct" as a Promising Category of Historical Analysis. *Slavic Review*. 62, no. 1 (2003): 1-23.
- Lih, Lars T. "How a Founding Document Was Found, or One Hundred Years of Lenin's 'What is to Be Done?'" *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History*. 4, no. 1 (2003): 5-49.

- MacKenzie, David and Michael W. Curran. *A History of Russia, the Soviet Union, and Beyond*. Belmont, CA: West/Wadsworth publishing 1999.
- Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels. *The Communist Manifesto*. New York: Signet Classic. 1998.
- Mayer, Robert. "The Dictatorship of the Proletariat From Plekhanov to Lenin." *Studies in East European Thought*. 45, no. 4 (1993): 255-280.
- McNeal, Robert. "Lenin's Attack on Stalin: Review and Reappraisal." *American Slavic and East European Review*. 18, no. 3 (1959): 295-314.
- Page, Stanley W. "Lenin's Assumption of International Proletarian Leadership." *Journal of Modern History*. 26 no. 3 (1954): 233-245.
- Pipes, Richard. *Three "Whys" of the Russian Revolution*. New York: Vintage books. 1997.
- Reed, John. *Ten Days That Shook the World*. Penguin Group. 1977.
- Riegel, Klaus-Georg. "Marxism-Leninism as a Political Religion." *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*. 6, no. 1 (2005): 97-126.
- Robinson, James Harvey and Charles Beard. *Readings in Modern European History*. Boston: Ginn and Company, 1908.
- Roth, Guenther. *The Social Democrats in Imperial Germany*. Totowa, New Jersey: The Bedminster Press, 1984.
- Rothenberg, Mel. "Lenin on The State." *Science and Society*. 59, no. 3 (1995): 418-436.
- Rusche, Harry. "The Human Cost."
<http://www.english.emory.edu/LostPoets/Casualties.html> (accessed 17 April 2007).
- Service, Robert. *Lenin: A Biography*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2000.
- Shaw, William H. "Towards the One-Party State in Zimbabwe: A Study in African Political Thought." *Journal of Modern African Studies*. 24 no. 3 (1986): 373-394.
- Smith, David G. "Lenin's Imperialism": A Study in the Unity of Theory and Practice." *Journal of Politics*. 17, no. 4 (1955): 546-569.

Swain, Geoffrey. "Lenin, Tyrant or Savior?" *Modern History Review*. 16, no. 1 (Jan 2004): 2-6.

Tucker, Robert C. "Towards a Comparative Politics of Movement-Regimes." *American Political Science Review*. 55, no. 2 (1961): 281-290.

Ward, Chris. *Stalin's Russia*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1999.

Weeks, Albert L. *The First Bolshevik, a Political Biography of Peter Tkachev*. New York: New York University Press. 1968.

Yarmaolinsky, Avrahm. *Road to Revolution*. Toronto: Collier Books 1969.
